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“We Were Not Prepared to Tell People Yet”:
Confidentiality Breaches and Boundary Turbulence on Facebook

Abstract
Communication Privacy Management theory provides a framework for investigating
confidentiality breaches that occur on Facebook. Open-ended online questionnaires served as
mechanism for collecting data about privacy violations and the resulting boundary turbulence.
Privacy violations validated three a priori categories (Petronio & Reierson, 2009) of
confidentiality breaches (privacy ownership violations, discrepancy breaches of privacy, and preemptive privacy control). Findings indicated that the lack of established explicit privacy rules led
to privacy violations and boundary turbulence. Results also provided insight regarding
motivations of privacy violations, reactions to privacy violations, and the role of privacy rules in
the violation.
Keywords: Communication privacy management, Facebook, privacy rules, boundary
turbulence, online communication
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1. Introduction
“Congrats on your pregnancy! I can’t believe you haven’t announced it yet!” With one
public Facebook post, a Facebook user has violated the privacy of another. Information
ownership and privacy rules are becoming blurred as technology advancements have exceeded
the rate of developing up-to-date privacy settings and privacy norms online. Facebook has
become one of the main tools for social interaction, as Facebook had over 1 billion active daily
users for September 2016 (Facebook, 2017). Due to its fast advancement and popularity, privacy
violations on the website via a person’s wall or news feed has become an important
communication concern among users. A New York Times article discussed this very notion,
explaining that although individual users might be careful with what they post online, online
friends and colleagues can often disclose personal information for them (Lohr, 2010). This
unwanted public disclosure of private information can be problematic because, as Walther and
Parks (2002) found in their investigation of warranting theory, people are more likely to judge a
person based on what others post on that person’s social networking site (SNS) rather than on
what the person him or herself posted. By studying examples of unmet expectations of privacy
online, we can begin to better understand why people violate others’ privacy in an online setting
and how communication can be adjusted to better protect that privacy.
Communication Privacy Management (CPM) theory addresses the dialectical tension
between disclosure and privacy, describing how and why people decide to reveal or conceal
private information. Prior research has examined CPM in a variety of face-to-face (FtF) contexts
including families (Afifi, 2003), healthcare (Petronio & Kovach, 1997), and in the workplace
(Allen, Walker, Coopman, & Hart, 2007). Recently, studies have focused on one’s own online
self-disclosure and perceptions of privacy on SNSs (Acquisti, Brandimarte, & Loewenstein,
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2015; Child, Pearson, & Petronio, 2009; Christofides, Muise, & Desmarais, 2009; Debatin,
Lovejoy, Horn, & Hughes, 2009; Ellison, Vitak, Steinfeld, Gray, & Lampe, 2011; Millham &
Atkin, in press; Trepte, Dienlin, & Reinecke, 2014; Vitak, 2012; Vitak & Kim, 2014; Waters &
Ackerman, 2011). Child and colleagues have extensively explored CPM as it occurs online,
examining the parent-child relationship and parental Facebook friend requests (Child &
Westermann, 2013) as well as privacy management during blogging (Child, Haridakis, &
Petronio, 2012; Child et al., 2009).
Although many researchers have explored CPM online, few have focused on the privacy
violations and resulting unrest that occur when one person reveals something confidential about
another person online. These actions can have adverse consequences on interpersonal
relationships. Houghton and Joinson (2010) found that privacy violations can negatively affect
friendships, citing issues related to trust and respect. Petronio and Reierson (2009) describe an
informal confidentiality contract that exists between interpersonal partners. When this contract is
violated our expectations of trust within the interpersonal relationship may shift causing a
climate of distrust. Further, Wang et al. (2011) assessed the regrets that people felt after sharing
private information (their own or co-owned), and identified that one regret resulted from
revealing another person’s secret. In the present study, we focus on the topic of the privacy
violation, perceived motivations behind them, and reactions to breaches in confidentiality. The
purpose of this research is to analyze privacy violations on Facebook that led to boundary
turbulence, investigating instances in which people violate confidentiality of another party.
1.1. Communication Privacy Management
CPM explains the process of concealing and revealing private information and is based
on three main elements – privacy ownership, privacy control, and privacy turbulence – that help
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us understand behaviors related to the disclosure of private information (Petronio, 2002, 2013).
First, privacy ownership supports the notion that individuals believe they own private
information about themselves, and others who are granted access to this information are
authorized co-owners (Petronio, 2013). People then feel entitled to control the flow of the
information, which comprises the privacy control component of CPM. People establish privacy
rules and boundaries to keep information confidential or share the information in an orderly
fashion, an action termed boundary establishment. Petronio (2002) warns that it is important to
establish explicitly stated privacy rules soon after the information is revealed. She recommends
setting concrete rules before a disruption occurs in order to avoid turbulence, essentially so
individuals are not given the opportunity to make mistakes. Individuals with whom information
is shared become “shareholders” and are expected to follow the original owner’s privacy rules,
which can be either explicitly or implicitly stated. Explicitly stated rules are direct with clear
expectations for how a confidant should treat the information (Petronio, 1991, 2002). This type
of rule includes a disclosure warning or prior restraint phrase, such as “Don’t tell anyone until I
say you can” (Petronio, 2002; Petronio & Bantz, 1991). Implicit rules are ambiguous and can
lead to boundary turbulence, the third element of CPM (Petronio, 2013). Boundary rule mistakes
are a common cause of boundary turbulence (Petronio, 1991). Petronio (2002) argued,
If the discloser only hints at a rule for how to access or protect the private information,
the confidant may not really understand the way he or she should treat privacy
management. This uncertainty may result in misunderstandings and hurt feelings when
the rule is not applied in the way the discloser envisioned. (p. 78) [emphasis in original]
Further disorder can occur because individuals do not always obey privacy rules, even if
they are explicitly established (Petronio, 2002). That is, the co-owner of information does not
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treat private information in the manner that the original owner expected. Petronio posited that
boundary turbulence would likely occur if the privacy management system breaks down. She
explains, “When people are unable to collectively develop, execute, or enact rules guiding
permeability, ownership, and linkages, the coordinating efforts of privacy management are
confounded and boundary turbulence occurs” (2002, p. 177).
Petronio (2002) outlined several reasons for unsuccessful boundary coordination that
leads to boundary turbulence, including intentional rule violations, boundary rule mistakes, fuzzy
boundaries, and boundary definition predicaments. These violations can “disrupt relationships”
and “compromise a sense of trust” (Petronio & Reierson, 2009, p. 376). Betrayal is one instance
of intentional rule violation, and this breached confidentiality causes boundary turbulence
(Petronio & Reierson, 2009). Information exposure is sometimes done out of resentment,
suspicion, or doubt; however, in most cases it is done out of uncertainty (Petronio, 2007).
Although boundary rule mistakes can be the result of people acting irresponsibly, these mistakes
are often due to people having a momentary lapse in judgment, making incorrect assumptions, or
misunderstanding expectations (Petronio, 2002). Moreover, fuzzy boundaries can also lead to
uncertainties about information ownership and boundary turbulence (Petronio, 2002). Finally,
boundary definition predicaments occur when people make private disclosures in public spaces
(such as a Facebook wall).
Solove’s (2008) taxonomy of privacy, he identified four activities that lead to privacyrelated problems: information collection, information processing, information dissemination, and
invasion. Behaviors in the information dissemination category are of increased interest, as these
actions also appear to cause boundary turbulence. Specific activities in this category include
breaches of confidentiality and disclosures. These are similar to Petronio and Reierson’s (2009)
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notions of betrayal and information exposure, respectively, that cause boundary turbulence.
We have established that co-ownership of private information can be difficult and can
result in boundary turbulence. Petronio and Reierson (2009) expand upon CPM theory by
describing in detail breaches of confidentiality and how those breaches impact trust in
interpersonal relationships. They create three categories to describe these breaches of
confidentiality: privacy ownership violations, discrepancy breaches of privacy, and pre-emptive
privacy control. They describe privacy ownership violations as, “…people’s ability to exercise
ownership and control according to their assumptions about rules for regulating their private
information is violated” (Petronio & Reierson, 2009, p. 377). Whereas discrepancy breaches of
privacy are defined as, “…anticipated expectations belonging to an original owner about his or
her privacy do not match the actual way co-owners regulate third-party access or the way others
gain access to become internal or unintentional co-owners” (Petronio & Reierson, 2009, p. 376).
Finally, pre-emptive privacy control rules are established because, “previous privacy breaches or
a lack of certainty about levels of trust” (Petronio & Reierson, 2009, p. 378). Each of these
concepts is posited as a means for understanding a violation of confidentiality (i.e. where
boundary turbulence is likely to occur). Because breaches of confidentiality are a central focus of
this study, these empirically derived categories from FtF encounters may provide a fruitful area
of theoretical focus for this study.
In response to boundary turbulence, the people involved try to correct the problem. They
revisit, readjust, or renegotiate privacy rules and expectations of others within the, nowdisrupted, collective boundary (Petronio, 2002). Petronio (2002) also indicated that people who
breach privacy rules are likely to be reprimanded, excluded from future disclosures, given
limited information in future conversations, or warned of their violation. These sanctions also
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help identify rules that might have been implied rather than explicitly stated.
Confidants may contribute different private information to the collective boundary,
taking into account the breadth and depth of the disclosure. Petronio and Reierson, 2009 note
that disclosure is not always reciprocal; the breadth, depth, and intensity of the secret may vary
from confidant to confidant which can shift the burden of the collective boundary. Incongruity of
disclosure must be addressed in order to restore equity in the relationship. In FtF interactions,
people try to restore balance and “equalize the incongruity by asking personal, probing
questions” (Petronio & Reierson, 2009, p. 370; see also Petronio & Kovach, 1997). However,
online there is not a mechanism to restore equity, particularly on SNSs when a confidant
discloses private information to excess of co-owners.
This is not the first study to use CPM in an online context; however, this study’s unique
theoretical contributions are to first, understand how privacy breaches are happening in online
communication, and second, address the inability to stifle a breach in privacy online. For
example, Petronio and Reierson (2009) suggest creating a confidentiality contract with a third
party should he or she become a co-owner. However, with SNSs, there are many co-owners of
information instantaneously. An example of this in a FtF interaction would be using a
megaphone to announce private information to a crowd. Although this example may seem
preposterous, it serves as a hypothetical example of how many third-party members would need
to be involved in a confidentiality contract in an online confidentiality breach.
Although CPM was originally developed to explain offline privacy management, it has
also been used to help explain disclosures in online settings (Child & Starcher, 2016; Child et al.,
2009; Christofides et al., 2009; Debatin et al., 2009; Ellison et al., 2011; Vitak, 2012), which are
further discussed.
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1.2. Communication Privacy Management in an Online Setting
Characteristics of communicating online, such as online disinhibition and context
collapse, can affect why one reveals information online that does not solely belong to him or her.
Although the online context can have an effect on why privacy violations happen, outcomes of
privacy violations online are similar to those that occur offline, as those whose privacy was
violated adjust their communication or their relationships with the violators.
1.2.1. Characteristics of Online Communication
First, the online disinhibition effect can result in communication that violates another
person’s privacy. Suler (2004) defined the online disinhibition effect as, “people [saying] and
[doing] things in cyberspace that they wouldn’t ordinarily say and do in the face-to-face world”
(p. 321). Six factors contribute to online disinhibition, including dissociative anonymity,
invisibility, and asynchronicity (Suler, 2004). Because of the anonymity afforded by Facebook
and other social media, it is less face-threatening to make statements to or about other people
online versus offline. Next, aspects of invisibility reduce one’s awareness of the presence and
reactions of others, also reducing the perceived risk of disclosing information. Similarly, the
asynchronicity provided by online communication allows people to avoid coping with someone’s
immediate reaction to a statement. Suler identified two types of online disinhibition: benign and
toxic. Benign disinhibition refers to revealing personal things about oneself or showing unusual
acts of kindness, and toxic disinhibition refers to rude and harsh language, anger, and threats.
Either type of disinhibition can lead to people disclosing information and violating another’s
privacy. Revealing information could be the result of an honest misunderstanding with good
intentions, indicative of benign disinhibition. For example, one person might congratulate
another in a Facebook posting before the original information owner made the success public.
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On the other hand, a person could maliciously reveal private information about another in order
to cause distress, a mark of toxic disinhibition.
Context collapse (Marwick & boyd, 2010) is another factor that can affect CPM in an
online context. Context collapse refers to multiple distinct audiences on an SNS combining (or
“flattening”) into one broad audience due to the nature of the SNS (p. 122). Digital crowding is a
similar concept that explains how information meant for one audience can be seen by another
audience (Joinson, Houghton, Vasalou, & Marder, 2011). Essentially, Joinson et al. (2011)
argued that privacy threats on SNSs result from excessive social contact. Visible communication
(e.g., wall posts, picture tagging, or comments) linked to a Facebook user by his or her Facebook
friends can threaten the user’s privacy. For example, Person A tags his or her friend, Person B, in
a Facebook post. Now, all of Person A’s friends can see what Person B was tagged in, and,
depending on Person B’s privacy settings, Person B’s friends can see this item too. As evident, it
has become increasingly difficult to navigate the multiple audiences on an SNS and meet one’s
privacy needs (Marwick & boyd, 2010).
1.2.2. Outcomes of Online Privacy Violations
As evident, online disinhibition can create an environment wherein communication
boundaries are violated, causing a host of problems. Communication, privacy, and technology
intertwine to cause boundary turbulence in online contexts such as Facebook. People generally
take steps to rectify any issues resulting from a privacy violation in order to regain face, as they
recognize the importance of maintaining a positive online presentation of self. As indicated
earlier and explained by warranting theory, others’ comments on a user’s Facebook page are
seen as more credible than if the user made the post him or herself (Walther & Parks, 2002;
Walther, Van Der Heide, Hamel, & Shulman, 2009). In addition, Walther, Van Der Heide, Kim,
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Westerman, and Tong (2008) found that a person’s social and task attractiveness are affected by
others’ comments on his or her Facebook wall.
After a violation occurs on Facebook, the person whose privacy was violated can detag
him or herself (i.e., remove the link to the user on the Facebook friend’s page), ask the poster to
remove the offending post, or contact Facebook; however, research indicates that the most
effective way to enforce privacy management is to communicate about boundaries when initially
sharing information to prevent boundary turbulence from occurring in the first place (Petronio,
2002). To practice effective privacy management, Petronio (2002) also recommends
implementing privacy rule foundations, coordinating collectively owned boundaries, and
unifying the collectively owned boundaries. CPM rules and boundaries need to be established
(both on- and offline) to avoid or prevent potential conflict. Boundaries help the people involved
understand who owns specific information, as someone with unclear boundaries often commits
privacy violation, resulting in lost trust and explicitly declared boundaries in future interactions.
In some situations, the transgressors experience remorseful emotions after revealing
confidential information about another person online. Although users might initially feel “safe”
posting sensitive or even malicious information online due to online disinhibition, they often
have regrets after publishing the information. Wang et al. (2011) identified reasons people had
post-sharing regret. One reason stemmed from revealing a friend’s secrets and other sensitive
content. Participants in the study said they made these later-regrettable posts because they were
trying to be funny, needed to vent frustration, had good intentions (e.g., a “congratulations” type
of post), or simply did not think about the consequences of the offending post.
1.3. Research Questions
In this study, we aimed to further explore the notion of boundary violations and
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turbulence in an online setting, specifically as these issues transpire on Facebook. We sought to
focus on the revelation of co-owned information on Facebook. That is, we examined instances in
which a person revealed information about another person on Facebook that was meant to be
private. To investigate these issues, we posed the following research questions:
RQ1: What topics are most commonly associated with privacy violations on Facebook?
RQ2: What are potential reasons for the privacy violations on Facebook?
RQ3: Were privacy violators provided with privacy rules prior to the violation?
RQ4: How did people react to privacy violations on Facebook?
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
Participants were recruited in a variety of ways. A link to the online questionnaire was
posted on Facebook (as the site is the focus in this investigation) with a brief explanation of the
study and eligibility requirements. Professors from several universities teaching a variety of
communication classes also made in-class announcements of the study to their students, and the
link to the questionnaire was posted to their online Learning Management Systems.
Participants were eligible for the questionnaire if they were 18 years of age or older and
had a privacy violation experience on Facebook. A privacy violation experience was defined as
having one’s own privacy violated or violating the privacy of another individual. One hundred
sixty-nine people completed the qualitative questionnaire, including 94 women and 75 men who
ranged in age from 18 to 59 years old, with a mean age of 21.14 years. Participants spent an
average of 1.73 hours per day on Facebook and reported an average of 692 Facebook friends.
Seventy-three percent (n = 123) of the participants’ used Facebook to maintain relationships,
73% (n = 122) used Facebook for entertainment, 61% (n = 103) for networking, 13% (n = 21) for
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professional use, and 5% (n = 9) for other uses, which included expressing themselves or
gathering information about products. Participants could select more than one reason.
2.2. Questionnaire
After affirming eligibility for the study and agreeing to the conditions of the online
consent form, the participant was directed to an online, open-ended questionnaire hosted by
Qualtrics. In the first part of the questionnaire, participants were asked to think about their most
recent experience of when they perceived someone as violating their privacy by revealing
information about the participant on Facebook. Participants described that experience by
providing information about the post’s content. They were then asked additional questions about
that privacy violation and their responses to it.
In the second part of the survey, participants were asked if they had ever violated
someone else’s privacy via a Facebook post. If the participant answered “Yes,” the questionnaire
continued by requesting him or her to describe the privacy-violating post and answer additional
questions about their participation in the privacy violation. Thirteen percent (n = 23) of
participants indicated that they had violated another’s privacy at some point. We found no
differences in the responses when comparing the violator and violatee perspectives. Finally, all
participants completed the demographics portion of the survey. All materials and procedures
were approved by the Institutional Review Boards at the authors’ institutions.
2.3. Analysis
To make sense of the data gathered though the questionnaire, we utilized thematic
analysis to help organize, describe, and interpret the information (Braun & Clarke, 2006). We
first used open coding to examine and categorize questionnaire responses into themes. For
example, one participant indicated that someone posted condolences for the death of the
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participant’s grandfather prior to that information being public. This response was coded as
“death/condolences.” We used the constant comparative method (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) to
compare each privacy violation topic to the next in order to garner unique codes. We coded 78
responses before theoretical saturation (when no new responses are given; Glaser & Strauss,
1967) was reached. This coding resulted in nine themes that represent the various topics of
privacy violations via Facebook: congratulations, relationship status, surprises, death/
condolences, pictures, location, family issues, contact information, and fights. We then engaged
in axial coding to combine similar topics, resulting in two overarching categories: Pre-emptive
Disclosure Violations and Discrepancy Breaches of Privacy. The same process of open and axial
coding was then repeated for each question from the questionnaire, reaching theoretical
saturation each time.
3. Results
Using an open-ended questionnaire, we asked participants questions about situations in
which a post by another person on Facebook violated their privacy. Using thematic analysis of
participants’ responses, we identified main privacy ownership violation, motivations for
violations, reactions to privacy violations, establishment (or lack thereof) of privacy rules, and
changes in communication behaviors.
3.1. Privacy Ownership Violation
As stated earlier, axial coding revealed two overarching themes categorizing privacy
ownership violation on Facebook: a) Pre-emptive disclosure violations, or prematurely
announcing items the original information owner would have eventually posted, and b)
Discrepancy breaches of privacy, or items the original owner probably would have never posted.
3.1.1. Pre-emptive disclosure violations
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Pre-emptive disclosure violations refer to the discussion of private information not
originally owned by the other party, yet the original information owner likely would have posted
it eventually. Examples in this category related to changes in one’s relationship status, attempted
surprises, and condolences for a death.
3.1.1.1. Congratulations. The majority of pre-emptive disclosure violations were related
to a situation in which a congratulatory Facebook post about an accomplishment, purchase, or
change violated the participants’ privacy and “took away the excitement” of announcing an
accomplishment themselves. An example of a pre-emptive disclosure violation read,
I had found out that I was pregnant, but didn't want to post it online until probably around
20 weeks, and one of my cousins had put something about “I hear congrats are in order”
when I was around 12 weeks.
In another example, a person explained that a friend of hers tagged her in a Facebook post about
her acceptance into college before she was able to tell her parents the news.
3.1.1.2. Relationship status change. The second largest group of violations revealed a
relationship status change, such as a newly dating couple, an engagement, a prom date, or a
breakup. One participant explained a violation about her new relationship status:
I was newly single and a bit embarrassed/shaken about breaking up with my long-term
boyfriend. I went out with my girlfriends and we all took pictures. One of my friends
titled the album “[Name] is single and ready to mingle!” This was before I had taken off
the relationship status on Facebook, and I was still Facebook friends with the ex.
Another person wrote, “I was recently proposed to in December. Before my fiancé and I told all
of our family members, one of my friends posted on my wall ‘congrats on your engagement.’”
3.1.1.3. Surprise. Some privacy violations revealed and ruined a surprise visit, gift, or
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party. A participant complained, “My aunt posted a picture of the gift I bought my parents for
their anniversary before I gave it to them.” Another person explained that he was planning on
sneaking to his hometown to surprise his friends and family, but someone posted a comment
revealing his intended visit before he got there, ruining the surprise.
3.1.1.4. Death/condolences. The final pre-emptive disclosure violation involves people
posting condolences about a death before the person knew about the death or before the whole
family was notified properly. For example,
When my dad passed away last year, out of respect, the family is supposed to announce
the death first. I felt my privacy violated on Facebook when numerous people posted
about my dad. I know they think they were doing good, but in fact they weren’t. Due to
the fact that other family members did not know yet and they had to find out via
Facebook due to the fact that we didn’t get a chance to tell everyone yet.
Another participant explained, “I wasn't sure how to deal with it when a cousin posted a
condolence on my site regarding a death in the family that had not yet been widely
communicated.”
3.1.2. Discrepancy Breaches of Privacy
A second group of privacy violation topics comprised the discrepancy breaches of
privacy category. These messages would not have been announced by the original owner because
it was confidential or inappropriate to share with non-intimate others. Examples of discrepancy
breaches of privacy included pictures, one’s location, private family issues, personal contact
information, and fights that the original owner wanted to keep unknown or unseen.
3.1.2.1. Pictures. The largest subcategory of discrepancy breaches of privacy posts
included pictures of the participant. The photos revealed unattractive or drunk participants, a
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childhood picture (a “throwback”), or that the participant was somewhere they were not
supposed to be located. Some examples in this category include, “A friend of mine posted
pictures of me while away on a float trip that I wasn’t supposed to be on. I told her not to post
them, but she forgot and still posted a few that I was in,” and, “In high school, my coach
threatened to kick me off the football team because he saw a picture of me holding a beer. I was
not friends with him on Facebook at the time.”
3.1.2.2. Location. Location was revealed by tagging the participant in one’s status or by
posting a photo of the participant in a location that he or she should not have been located. One
participant described her experience,
Once my parents called me while I was at a concert that I didn't want them to know
about. I went to the bathroom away from the noise and convinced them that I was at my
dorm studying for the night. Later, when I checked my Facebook, I saw that one of my
friends had tagged me in a post about being at the concert, and I had to untag myself and
delete the post from my page before my parents would see it and know that I had lied.
Another person had a similar incident when he was tagged at a beach when he was supposed to
be in class reviewing for a test, and he had recently friended the professor of that class.
3.1.2.3. Private family issues. Some participants listed family-related situations as topics
inappropriately discussed on Facebook. These issues focused on abuse, medical concerns, and
parents divorcing. One person explained that a family member of hers had cancer and was
undergoing surgery. That family member wanted to keep that information within the family until
more information about the diagnosis was known; however, another family member posted
something on Facebook, revealing the diagnosis to everyone. In another instance, a participant
revealed to her friend that her parents were getting divorced. This friend commented about the
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divorce on a status before the family’s friends and extended family members were told, which
caused embarrassment for both the participant and her parents.
3.1.2.4. Personal contact information. A few Facebook users posted the participants’
private contact information, such as a phone number, student ID card, or password to an online
account. In one example, the participant explained an inadvertent privacy violation: “My
roommate posted a picture of my car outside of my home. In the picture you can see my street
sign, apartment number, license plate number, make and model of car, etc.”
3.1.2.5. Fights. Violations in this category occurred when people disclosed information
about the study participant taking part in physical or verbal fights both on- and offline. For
example, a participant described her encounter with a person who chose to continue a prior FtF
disagreement on the participant’s Facebook page. The participant said, “The person could have
private messaged me, but for some reason posted it for all to see.”
3.2. Pre-emptive Privacy Control
Survey participants were asked if they had set up any rules with the privacy violator
regarding the inappropriately revealed message. Some indicated that they established rules at the
time they disclosed the information to their friend, but their friend did not adhere to this rule. For
example a participant wrote, “I told my friend not to mention it and I was upset to see that he
spilled the beans and posted my info for anyone to see.” Others mentioned establishing the same
rule regarding pictures being posted. They told the person not to upload certain pictures, but the
violator uploaded them despite the rule. One participant indicated that he was always mindful of
establishing privacy rules when telling someone confidential information: “If I share personal
information with people in a conversation, I explicitly say ‘DO NOT SHARE THIS ON
FACEBOOK.’” Fifty-seven percent (n = 71) said they did not provide co-owners with an explicit
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privacy rule. Additionally, almost half of participants who violated another’s privacy on
Facebook said they were not given a privacy rule about the information before they committed
the violation. They realized they committed a privacy violation only when confronted afterward.
Some participants said they declared privacy rules for the violator after the privacy
violation in order to prevent future transgressions. Rules included not posting pictures without
permission, not giving out phone numbers, or simply not posting anything about the person.
Many of these rules were also coupled with a demand to remove the offending post or photo.
3.3. Motivations for Violations
Based on speculation from the participants, including information from participants who
did violate another person’s privacy online, it appeared that the motivation for violating
another’s privacy fell into one of two categories: either malicious or innocent in nature. When
people had malicious intent, it was due to jealousy, spite, retribution, or selfishness. One person
described her perception of the other’s intent, “I would say that they wanted to feel relevant or
something by disclosing information that nobody knew.” However, another person explained
that his friend posted private information “because they were mad at me and wanted to
embarrass me.”
For the majority of the violations, however, people indicated that the violator probably
meant no harm by their Facebook post. Many suggested that their friend was excited, overeager,
or proud. One person wrote, “My friend was happy for me. He was proud of me and wanted to
share it with everybody else.” Others described the violator was trying to be funny by posting
their comments. Numerous participants chalked up the violation to a simple accident or that the
person probably did not know it was a “big deal” to reveal that information. One participant who
violated another person’s privacy explained, “I didn’t think she would mind me posting it.”
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3.4. Reactions to Privacy Violations
Participants had various responses and reactions to the privacy violation. Some had an
emotional response, others fixed the issue, and another group claimed to be indifferent.
3.4.1. Emotional
People described their emotional response to the privacy violation as mad, surprised,
irritated, disappointed, angry, violated, or betrayed. Many said they “felt cheated” because they
wanted to be the one to share their news. One participant revealed, “I was a little perturbed. It
should have been my good news to share when I wanted to.” Another wrote, “I was mad,
surprised someone actually posted something so personal without my consent.” Violations
related to pictures, family issues, contact information, and death resulted in the most negative
emotions, likely because they are considered “high risk” topics (Warren & Laslett, 1977). Yet,
the people who confided high-risk secrets failed to provide privacy rules nearly half of the time.
3.4.2. Stifling an online breach
Some participants in the study said they tried to fix the issue and, in some cases, save
face following a violation. Some people quickly posted their announcement themselves. One
wrote, “[After the violation] My fiancé put on Facebook that we were engaged and how excited
we are. This was so people would hear it from us and not just a friend.” Others also engaged in
“damage control,” and contacted friends and family would should hear the information first-hand
instead of on Facebook. These were particularly evident for the topics related to premature
congratulations or comments about relationships. A participant said, “I just had to explain to my
parents why I had not informed them yet.” Additionally, many people utilized Facebook’s builtin settings that help control these situations. Some users detagged themselves from a post or
picture. Others adjusted their online privacy settings so they have to approve a photo tag, or they
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blocked all wall posts. A small number considered deleting their Facebook account. In some
instances, people contacted the violator themselves and asked for the offensive post or picture to
be removed. Some privacy rules were created and clearly described after the violation, and other
people chose to make changes in their communication with friends who violated their privacy.
3.4.3. Indifference
The final example of reaction to a privacy violation was that of indifference. Some
people said they were not fazed by the revelation, and others simply ignored the post. One person
claimed, “I just let it go.” Another respondent was not mad at the violator; she was mad at
herself. She explained, “I knew that it was a mistake of my own that I made by sharing the
information with her.”
3.5. Relationship and Communication Changes
As a result of the privacy violations identified in this study, many participants’
communication and relationships with the violator changed due to a newly developed lack of
trust with the violator. In some instances, the person blocked all communication and ended the
relationship with the transgressor. Others increased communication with that person in order to
provide additional privacy rules.
In many instances, the relationship between the violator and violated did not change.
Sometimes it was because the person was not even aware that he or she disclosed something that
should have been private. Others indicated that the relationship and communication did not
change because the person who revealed the secret “meant no harm” or that it was revealed “by
accident.” One participant said the relationship did not change, “but I just feel weird around the
person thinking that they might be intentionally trying to find out information about me.”
In a few instances, people actually increased communication with the person who
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violated their privacy. One person who admitted to violating another’s privacy explained, “She
communicates to me more what is going on with her other friends so I know when to avoid
sharing information about her.” Another revealed, “Now we are in a constant battle to get back at
each other by posting funny pictures and statuses about each other.” She went on to say that the
incident likely made their friendship stronger. This reaction was rare.
In many situations, the respondent declared that he or she decided to be selective about
the topics discussed with the violator due to lost trust in him or her. For example one person said,
“I no longer tell her anything that I want to be a secret or anything that is supposed to be a
surprise.” Another person explained that this circumscribing type of communication led to a
modified relationship, “I do not feel as if I can trust her with information anymore so our
conversations are generic.” Others indicated that they still share information with the violator,
but they wait until everyone else knows about the information first.
Finally, some participants explained that they cut off communication in some manner,
and others effectively ended the relationship with that person. Several simply blocked the
violator from posting anything on his or her Facebook wall or tagging the person in anything.
Others said, “I deleted him from Facebook,” “I don’t speak to him anymore,” or, “We do not talk
and she is no longer my friend.” It is notable that nearly all of the people who violated one’s
privacy related to family-issues were given an explicit privacy rule (which was ignored). These
transgressions led to terminated communication in each instance.
4. Discussion
This study highlighted boundary violations and turbulence in an online setting by
investigating instances in which a person breached confidential info owned by another person on
Facebook. We were able to address the research questions by identifying topics associated with a
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privacy violation, perceived motivations for the violation, use of privacy rules, and reactions to
the violation. Primarily, analysis revealed that the use of explicit privacy rules would have likely
prevented many privacy violations and related boundary turbulence, though some confidentiality
breaches are likely to occur in spite of explicit rules (Petronio & Reierson, 2009; see also
Petronio, 2002).
The discrepancy breaches of privacy (see Petronio & Reierson, 2009) had a higher risk
than the pre-emptive disclosure violation (see Petronio & Reierson, 2009), which were meant to
be a secret forever. A discrepancy breach of privacy is risky to the original information owner
and can result in a high level of vulnerability when others discover the information (Warren &
Laslett, 1977). Although high-risk episodes or topics tend to be accompanied by a thicker
privacy boundary with higher need for control (Petronio, 2002), people in the current study who
revealed this confidential high-risk information (e.g., family issues, contact information, or
death-related topics) were rarely given explicit privacy rules.
According to Petronio (2002), the five different types of risk are security, stigma, face,
relational, and role. These particular risks describe what violators should take into consideration
prior to the privacy violation. Based on the findings in this study, these risks were overlooked by
the privacy violators, as individuals disclosed information without considering the original
information owner’s emotions, status, or well-being. This discovery, coupled with the finding
that privacy rules are rarely discussed, underscores the importance of creating explicit privacy
rules (see Petronio, 2002) and communicating those with any information co-owners. A possible
relational script to create a privacy marker (i.e., shared privacy boundary) is simply to say, “this
is not Facebook official,” when communicating private information. This simple script may
provide a practical means of making privacy expectations explicit to a confidant negating
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possible disclosure missteps that result is an accidental disclosure. Although this script will not
correct other disclosures of confidential information, accidental disclosures encompassed the
majority of the violations in this study. Wang et al. (2011) found that accidental revelations still
resulted in regret. Therefore, it is suggested that if the original information owner provides no
privacy rules, the new co-owner of information should ask for a privacy rule or guidelines as to
how the information should be protected.
Although (Petronio, 2002) recommended that people explicitly declare any privacy rules
at the time of information dissemination, more than half of the participants in the present study
did not provide the new shareholder with an explicitly stated privacy rule. Again, boundary
turbulence often occurs because of boundary rule mistakes, usually made as the result of
uncertainty (Petronio, 2007). So, if one neglects to clearly identify a privacy rule and provide
that to the co-owner, who is truly at fault if the co-owner shares that information with others?
Managing privacy differs from person to person based on their unique interpretation of
disclosure. No “typical” set of rules exists for each privacy disclosure; however, broadly
speaking, communication needs to be clear so expectations do not go unmet, thus creating
boundary turbulence. People often have norms regarding their expectations of privacy on
Facebook, but many do not often follow the norms themselves when disclosing others’
information. For example, numerous participants indicated that they did not provide their friends
with privacy rules regarding the secret because they thought their friends would know better than
to post the private information on Facebook (for discrepancy breaches of privacy). Others
thought that their co-owners would know not to post anything on Facebook until the original
owner him or herself made the news “Facebook official” (for pre-emptive disclosure violations).
These indications reveal the use of implicit rules (Petronio, 1991), which are only alluded to by
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the original information owner. The current study indicated that implicit rules were not enough
to keep the co-owner from unintentionally sharing information meant to be kept private. Petronio
(2002) posited that some privacy rules become habitual, creating patterned actions or routinized
rules. The fact that violators did not “know better” reveals a lack of these routinized rules. It is
apparent that we do not have agreed-upon norms for information disclosure online, signifying a
need to explicitly declare privacy rules when sharing private information with others.
Further, the findings indicated that when people chose to utilize explicit privacy rules
online, they did so because they realized Facebook users do not have a standard rule that
everyone follows (i.e., Do not share something on Facebook that has not already been made
“Facebook official” by the original information owner), even though many people believe such a
norm exists. It appears that people do not acquire this rule through socialization when they join
Facebook (or any other SNS for that matter), nor has this rule stabilized yet, ensuring consistent
use (as described in Petronio, 2002). Moreover, though this implicit rule exists and is learned
through SNS interactions, people choose to stifle breaches offline. When third party
confidentiality breaches occurred, trust with the co-owner was compromised, and subsequently,
participants report increasing the rigidity of boundaries (see Petronio, 2002) or terminating the
relationship. As such, privacy breaches have lasting real implications for the participants’ daily
lived-experiences with others both online and FtF.
Trepte et al.’s (2014) longitudinal research indicated that users’ negative experiences on
SNSs do have an effect on informational privacy behaviors but did not have an effect on social
(i.e., their general audiences) or psychological (i.e., kinds of information shared) privacy
behaviors. That is, people adjusted the information posted online, but they did not modify their
overall accessibility online. Participants in the current study did revisit, readjust, and renegotiate
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their privacy rules and expectations in response to boundary turbulence, as forecasted by
Petronio (2002) and reified in Trepte et al.’s (2014) research. This was evident in the responses
to boundary turbulence as people attempted to resolve the issue. Much of the activity here
focused on face-saving maneuvers (staving off face-risk, Petronio, 2002) such as quickly posting
the announcement themselves, explaining themselves to friends and family, or detagging,
deleting, or defriending on Facebook. While the use of privacy tools to protect one’s privacy
online is useful, Litt (2013) found that certain groups of people (based on demographic
characteristics, motivation, and SNS experiences) are more prone to take advantage of SNSs’
privacy tools. So, although people might intend to make necessary adjustments to protect their
privacy, they might not have the knowledge of or experience with the SNS to properly use the
available privacy tools.
In many cases, the transgression triggered an explicitly-stated rule, in line with Petronio
(2002)’s discussion of privacy violations and sanctions. In other instances, people did not
mention to their offending friend that a violation took place. One person remarked, “I didn’t say
anything about it to her [the violator],” which was echoed among other participants. Failing to
confront an information co-owner following the privacy violation can perpetuate such violations.
Perhaps norms regarding information sharing online do not exist because they simply are not
being discussed before or after the violation.
Perhaps the largest influence on the privacy violations stem from the notion that
Facebook is essentially public, although it can give the impression of being more private, which
inherently points to Petronio’s dialectic of privacy and disclosure. Thus, the online environment
could be a significant factor leading to privacy violations and subsequent boundary turbulence.
The online context may also affect privacy disclosures in other respects as well. For example,
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because we might be worried about someone revealing private disclosures online before we get
the chance to do it ourselves (even with explicit privacy rules), we might disclose information to
people more quickly than we would prefer. This has implications for potential changes in longstanding social norms. Perhaps more pressing is the revelation that social norms are being
translated across platforms and into an electronic format. Findings in the present study reveal
preliminary information about the development (or lack of development) of social norms in a
mediated context. Further research should continue to investigate this norm evolution.
Data was collected in early 2014, which might have some bearing on the outcomes.
Acquisti et al.’s (2015) research indicates that users’ publicly posted information is on the
decline. This behavioral change might be a result of the high number of (unintended) privacy
violations that occurred online and the subsequent re-assignment of privacy boundaries. If this is
the case, people participating in public forums are regulating private information through the use
of more rigid privacy boundaries (see Petronio, 2002). Petronio posits that our privacy
boundaries shift throughout our lifespan, with adulthood having the most firm or rigid
boundaries. It may be that as participation in SNSs increases, participants are engaging in more
“adult” behaviors online, and subsequently restricting disclosure to others through decreasing the
amount of disclosure in online public forums.
Future research should continue examining third-party disclosures of information and
subsequent privacy management. Although a plethora of research has examined interpersonal
self-disclosure through CPM, this study posits a unique contribution; namely, that co-owners of
information violate the privacy needs of another by disclosing online. To this end, quantitative
analysis of this topic would further advance CPM and aid in explanation and prediction of such
behaviors. Although a reliable instrument for CPM has yet to be constructed, to advance this
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theory, future researchers should employ Likert-type items to establish the prevalence and
severity of third party privacy breaches online and the re-construction of privacy
norms/interpersonal trust after a breach occurs.
5. Conclusion
This study focused on one online channel in which privacy violations can occur. While
the information in this study cannot be generalized to other SNSs (such as Twitter or Instagram),
using Harding’s (1998) conceptualization of “movability,” we can assume that similar violations
take place on these various sites as well. Future research could help determine how other SNSs
users manage confidentiality breaches. It would be useful to explore online privacy violations
from both the violated persons’ perspectives as well as the violators’ perspectives. Moreover, it
would be interesting to compare the privacy violations online to privacy violations offline. That
is, do people view violations online as less or more offensive than violations offline and how
these offenses impact trust (see Petronio & Reierson, 2009) with the other party. As discussed
earlier, context collapse enhances rules violations, as friends of friends might see the information
posted. Because we do not often know our Facebook friends’ privacy settings, more people
might know our information than we presume. Additionally, the warranting effect says people
are more likely believe others’ posts about us than our own posts about ourselves (Walther &
Parks, 2002). Due to context collapse and warranting effect, online privacy violations might have
a greater effect on regrets and boundary turbulence than offline privacy violations, as negative
posts by others about a person can have a negative effect on one’s social and physical
attractiveness (Walther et al., 2008) at an exponential rate. Further, as Houghton and Joinson
(2010) discovered, privacy violations can and do harm the offline relationship, likely because
privacy violators are sometimes excluded from future communication (Petronio, 2002).
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In summary, this study serves to help aid in understanding the types of privacy violations
and confidentiality breaches that occur online as well as reactions to these violations. The
research also further illustrates how principles of CPM operate in an online context, coupled with
notions of context collapse, warranting, and online disinhibition.
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